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On the evening of 28 December 1942 some 2000 Pretoria municipal
workers living in the municipal compound and "Tin Town" In
Marabastad staged a large scale demonstration over conditions of
service and wages. Within three hours a large police contingent,
units of the Union Defence home-guard, Joined by large numbers of
armed white vigilantes, and led by three armoured cars, attacked
the demonstrators. 16 African workers were killed, 111 were
injured and a white policeman was accidentally shot to death by
his fellow officers. The rank brutality of various arms of the
state power, and of the surrounding white populous - some of whom
continued to "randomly assault natives" through the night - alone
suggests that this tragic episode merits detailed description and
analysis. But the conflict is even more interesting because it
represents a series of culminating and turning points in the
history of the urban African working class, and especially for
those in the Pretoria region. The Marabastad massacre ended a
forty year long struggle for total urban segregation in Pretoria
with the remaining population of Marabastad being urgently
"relocated" the next year. The uprising and its brutal
suppression was also a culminating point in long and keen battles
between the central and local state over issues of the
reproduction of the urban African population and the financing of
residential segregation.
Besides being a watershed in the struggles between the local and
central state, the uprising provides a focus for the emergence of
trade unions In Pretoria in the early 1940s. The Communist Party,
(which was initially blamed for causing the disturbances) had
started to unionise the municipal workers and other workers In
Pretoria, and the events in Marabastad highlighted the problems
of extending unionism on a regional level. The Marabastad
massacre also marked the beginning of a more repressive state
policy towards labour and strike action.
For these reasons the Marabastad uprising - limited, brief, and
tragic as It was - deserves comprehensive study. This paper will
however focus on just three areas for the moment: the conflict
between the central and local state over urban African wages and
living conditions, the role played by the Communist Party and
trade unions in organising the working classes in Pretoria, and,
the myriad of factors leading to the overwhelming rage and
frustration that propelled a desperately marginalised hostel
population to, in the racially loaded words of the official
commission's report: "run amok" in a "state of frenzied
excitement...and a spirit of lawlessness...(without evidence of)
any concerted plan of action> or any leadership", to destroying
1700 panes of glass and seriously damaging large parts of their
compound. But their rage was not the atavistic "primitive" and
Irrational outpouring of feeling that initial newspaper reports
suggested. The Commission of Enquiry, to Its credit, found
conditions of the most appalling hardship, coupled with official
high-handedness and rank stupidity, had been almost entirely
responsible for the context and immediate spark to the "riot". It
is these conditions that this paper will briefly examine. A more
detailed account of the uprising, and the longer term context in
which it took place and the key actors who precipitated It, Is
currently under preparation.
The Urban Areas Act of 1923 had placed the responsibility for the
reproduction of the African working classes in the hands of the
local authorities. Yet the struggles between the central and
local state over the burden of finance continued to be played
out. When a wage board determination threatened to put the local
authorities substantially out of pocket, protest was vociferous
and immediate, and central government initially showed itself
willing to support local government on this issue. Such collusion
and the high-handed behaviour of the Minister of Labour, as this
paper will show, aroused the confusion and anger of the African
unskilled workers, and precipitated the events of this tragic
drama. It is significant that when strikes threatened to upset
central government's desire for a stable labour force, the
central state was unwilling to support the local state in their
evasion of financial responsibility towards the African working
classes.
On 6 November 1942 the Wage Board gazetted wage board
determination 105 under the Wages Act of 1937 which would bring
into effect a scale of minimum wages for unskilled workers from
30 November 1942. It also made provision for wages to be paid
weekly and-for two weeks annual paid leave.1
The Wage Board was a statutory body created by the Wage Act of
1925. it was authorised to investigate conditions in particular
industries and to issue minimum wage determinations for specific
Job categories. Their determinations were to be non-
discriminatory on the grounds of race.2
UWL, ADI433, Cp9.2.3: Report of the Judicial Commission
of Enquiry into the Pretoria Municipal Riot of 28
December 1942
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The creation of the Wage Board was Intended to provide
protection to lowly paid white workers who had been excluded by
the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924. In 1937 the new Wage
Board Act allowed unions to present evidence for minimum wage
boards. This created the space for representation of black
workers who had been denied representation on industrial councils
and could not be members of registered trade unions under the
above act.
The Wage Board machinery had been used to good effect by Max
Gordon and the Joint Committee of African Trade Unions (JCATU)
in the late 1930s. Gordon won several wage board decisions
between 1937 and 1941 which gained legitimacy for JCATU and led
to increased union membership. He had been concerned not to
alienate the Department of Labour and worked within a legal
framework.3
Many of the gains made by the growth of trade unions in the early
war years were lost by the introduction of War Measure No.9 and
No.145 of 1942. War Measure No.9 provided for the speedy
settlement of labour disputes which might hinder the war effort
or Interfere with essential supplies or services while War
Measure No.145 . prevented black workers from striking."
Furthermore) by 1942 the leadership of trade union organisations
and the Communist Party were sympathetic to the South African war
effort and therefore did much to restrain the rank and file from
strike action."
Within the context of reduced bargaining power for workers
together with a spiralling cost of living and Inadequate wages,
the Wage Board was clearly viewed as an important source for the
redress of workers' grievances. The implementation of Wage Board
Determination 105 was a significant piece of industrial
legislation for many black unskilled workers. In particular, it
was the first attempt to lay down a minimum wage for municipal
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Workshop, 1980
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workers. In 192? a hundred municipal workers had made
representation to the Wage Board to fix their wages with no
effect.*
Wage Determination 105 was not however uniform it its
application. Only 34 trades were included in the determination,
and the rate of pay varied from centre to centre. In Pretoria) it
was determined at 24/- a week whereas in Johannesburg, it was set
at 25/-.v There does not appear to be any justification for this
as both the cost of living and the conditions of Industrial
enterprise were practically the same in both areas. Furthermore,
the fixing of a minimum wage at a maximum of 25/- a week undercut
certain industries where wages were higher, and had the effect of
lowering wagesr such as the case of the building Industry where
previously unskilled workers earned 28/- a week.s
The Pretoria City Council, along with the other councils on the
Reef, strongly objected to the proposed determination as this
would subject them to added costs. The Municipal Association of
the Transvaal and the Council of Reef Municipalities met with the
Minister of Labour, W.B.Madeley, to request that the
determination be deferred until the end of the war. The Minister
agreed to exempt local authorities from the provisions of the
determination until 1 April 1943, when they would be required to
pay the minimum wage less 2/- until 1 July 1943 when the full
wages would come into force. The Minister required that each
local authority apply for exemption individually.*5'
On 21 November 1942 the Pretoria City Council applied for
exemption from Wage Board Determination 105. The Council
prevaricated around the issue of their financial responsibilities
towards the African municipal workers. They argued that the
establishment of Atteridgevllle in 1939 had involved them In
considerable expense and they' could not afford the projected
additional costs should the determination be implemented.lo This
K 172, Vol.2: Evidence of Solly Sachs to the Commission
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K 172, Vol 5: Memorandum of Evidence by the Native
Representative Council and African Municipal Workers
K 172, Vol.3: Summary of Meeting between the Minister
of Labour and the Council of Reef Municipalities and
the Municipal Association of the Transvaal, 12 November
1942
K 172, Vol3: Memorandum submitted by the Pretoria City
Council to the Wage Board, 3 March 1942
was essentially not true. In its budget for the year 1942-1943,
the Pretoria City Council had made provision for an amount of
£35)000 to meet the cost of an anticipated increase in wages.
This sum was in fact sufficient to meet the proposed increase
from 30 November 1942. "
Further justifications were also provided. The Council suggested
that the living conditions of unskilled workers had not changed
substantially since the outbreak of the war> while the rise in
the cost of living had been met by an adequate cost of living
allowance.12 This was patently not true, the evidence of
numerous workers bears testimony to the severe hardships endured
as a result of inadequate wages, a soaring cost of living and
shortages brought on by the Second World War. Municipal employees
in Pretoria earned an average of 13/6d a week which was paid on a
monthly basis and were also paid a weekly cost of living
allowance of I/.13 However, since the determination had been
passed, the cost of living had increased by at least 25 per cent.
In particular, food prices were higher than all other items of
consumption, and municipal workers were continually forced to
supplement their frugal diet.
Failing this tack, the Council suggested that should exemption
not be possible, the determination should be lower in Pretoria as
"the type of non-European labour available in Pretoria
must be classed In a much lower standard than that
obtained in the areas where the Board has conducted its
most recent investigations."1*
The Pretoria City Council felt encouraged that they would receive
the exemption from the determination as the Minister of Labour
had agreed to exempt the Johannesburg City Council on the grounds
that the City Council did not have the necessary financial
resources available at the present time. The Minister had
however exceeded his authority. The Wage Board had previously
determined that the municipalities could afford to pay the
increases and it was the duty of the Minister to administer and
UWL: Report to the Secretary of the South African
Trades and Labour Council, by V.C.Berrange, 5 July 1943
K 1?2, Vol 3: Memorandum submitted by the Pretoria City
Council to the Wage Board, 3 March 1942
K 172, Vol.1: Memorandum submitted by the Department of
Labour to the Commission of Enquiry into the Pretoria
riots
K 172, Vol.3: Memorandum submitted by the Pretoria City
Council to the Wage Board, 3 March 1942
enforce the provisions of the determination.13 To some extent,
the actions of the Minister were responsible for the events of
the 28 December 1942. His disregard of the Wage Board's decision
and his attempts to appease the local authorities at the expense
of unskilled workers led to immediate worker reaction.
On 8 December 1942, 600 municipal employees from the Selby
Compound in Johannesburg went on strike. The apparent cause of
the strike was the Johannesburg Municipality's refusal to pay the
municipal workers their increases due to their exemption from the
determination. Negotiations between the Council, the Department
of Labour and the Municipal Workers' Union resulted in the
Council's withdrawal of its application for exemption and payment
of wages according to the determination.1A
Once the Johannesburg City Council demonstrated their ability to
pay the municipal workers in accordance with the determination,
the Minister of Labour withdrew all exemptions and insisted that
the Increase be paid retrospectively from the 30 November 1942.
Central government proved willing to appease local authorities
only as long as It did not affect its own political agenda.
Between 1942 and 1943 the central state was at pains not to
antagonise its urban African population. A stable urbanised
labour force was required to meet the demands of war-time
industry and with its soldiers at war, and a lack of funds and
staff at its disposal to enforce influx control, the state
adopted a conciliatory role towards the urban African labour-
force. Pass laws were relaxed and a concerted effort was made to
K 172, Vol.2: Evidence of Minister of Labour to the
Commission
K 172, Vol.1: Memo of Strikes in Johannesburg submitted
to the Assistant Director of Native Labour,
Johannesburg. There were three other strikes in
Johannesburg, all taking place on the 14 December 1942.
The Brick and Tile Workers went on strike for higher
wages. Trade union leaders prevailed on the strikers to
return to work. The second strike involved 1000 workers
in the Wholesale Meat Industry who objected to the slow
implementation of the wage determination. Negotiations
between the trade unions, the employers and officials
of the Labour Department led to the strikers returning
to work the next day. In the third Instance, 200
workers from the Sun Crush Mineral Water Factory
demanded £2 a week. The strike was unauthorised by the
trade union and fizzled out.
enhance the stability of the African labour force.X7 When the
reality of strike action threatened to jeopardise this plan of
action, the central government quite willingly handed over the
crisis of administering the costs of urban reproduction to the
local state.
The Pretoria City Council was informed by letter on 19 December
1942 that the Minister would not grant them the desired
exemption. On 22 December 1942 the City Council decided that the
provisions of the Wage Determination would be carried out and
this information was conveyed, albeit inadequately, to the
municipal workers on the 28 December 1942.ie
The high-handed manner and tactlessness of the local state
officials in dealing with the wage board determination and the
municipal workers undoubtedly ignited the deep-rooted anger of
the municipal workers into open confrontation. A meeting was
scheduled for 7p.m. on the evening of the 28th December to inform
the workers that they would receive their wage increase.
J.S.Hardy, the Location Superintendent, who was particularly
hostile to the African population, failed to arrive timeously,
and F.J. Botes, the compound manager, went ahead with the
meeting. Botes Informed the crowd that they would receive their
increases, but he was uncertain of the date. The general feeling
of the workers was one of impatience, dissatisfaction and
disbelief, and repeated shouts of "they are throwing a blanket
over our eyes" resounded among the municipal employees. "
When Hardy arrived at 7.30p.m. a second meeting was held. This
bewildered the workers and many believed that Hardy had arrived
with their promised wages. Hardy explained that the municipal
workers would receive their increases in salary from November but
he failed to convey effectively to the crowd that they would
receive their increase retrospectively from November 1942. It
appears that many municipal employees understood that the
determination would take effect from November 1943. Despite the
atmosphere of confusion that reigned at the meeting, Hardy
refused any questions to be asked.
The workers, feeling angry and confused, began shouting and
singing. There were shouts of "Tshaya! (Hit him) He has our
See D.Hindson, Pass Controls and the Urban African
Proletariat, Ravan Press: Johannesburg, 1987
K 172, Vol.3: Summary of negotiations between the
Minister of Labour and the Pretoria City Council
K 172, Vol.5: Memorandum of Evidence by the Native
Representative Council and the African Municipal
Workers
8money!" The meeting was disbanded and one African police
constable attempted to clear a path for Botes and Hardy, with a
cane, hitting one of the workers in the process. The workers,
feeling under attack and with a sense of their grievances not
being met, unleashed their pent-up fury and shortly after
7.30p.m, they attacked the compound. According to Charlie Muntsa,
the workers attacked the buildings
"to show those men in the police that we had nothing to
do with them; there are other people whom we were up
against."-^
The refusal of the Pretoria City Council to recognise the African
trade unions in Pretoria and to work through established worker
channels does - explain in part the level of confusion and anger
that erupted in the municipal compound. Gana Makabeni, President
of CNETU, indicated how trade union intervention in Johannesburg
over the issue of wage board determination 105 brought the
strikes to a quick end and no worker violence was reported.
The strikes in Johannesburg in December and the successful
intervention of the trade unions raise certain questions. To what
extent were workers in Pretoria aware of the events in
Johannesburg? How effective was trade union organisation in
Pretoria? And did the trade unions play a significant role in the
events of the 28th December?
Attempts at effective trade union organisation in Pretoria began
in 1939, largely through the initiatives of Naboth Mokgatle.
Inspired by Max Gordon, Mokgatle established a Pretoria branch of
the African Commercial and Distributive Workers' Union (ACDWU).
The problems encountered by Mokgatle in establishing a union
reflect many of the stumbling blocks to effective organisation in
Pretoria. The coordination of activities from the head office in
Johannesburg hampered efficiency and thereby lessened the
credibility of the Pretoria ACDWU. The dependence on white trade
unionists, to provide direction and trade union training, as well
as to organise essentials such as office accommodation and
equipment, delayed effective organisation.Z1 Furthermore,
according to Lodge, the use of the least experienced and most
Junior members of the CPSA to carry out trade union work in
Pretoria, suggests that the CPSA did not regard it as a top
priority, and reflects the split in the party over the
K 172, Vol 4: Evidence of Charlie Muntsa to the
Commission of Enquiry
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mobilisation of blacks.az
Much of the organisation and coordination of Pretoria's trade
unions was carried out by Mike Muller. Muller was from an
Afrikaans background and had matriculated at Greys College in the
Orange Free State in 1939. He attended University College in
Bloemfontein in 1940 and came to Pretoria in 1941 at the age of
nineteen. He was a member of the Communist Party, from which he
drew a salary, and he took up the task of organising trade unions
for black workers in Pretoria.
Young, hardworking and filled with the fervour of his beliefs,
Muller vigorously threw himself into the task of organising
unions in Pretoria. In August and September 1941 he organised
the African Match and Glass Workers Union, followed by the Cement
workers Union and the Dairy Workers Union. By 1942 there were
twelve unions in Pretoria which were affiliated to the Joint
Council of Non-European Trade Unions of which Muller was
Secretary.
A rival grouping of trade unions, the Federation of African Trade
Unions, was also established in Pretoria under the leadership of
Jacob Modlba. He opened the offices in Pretoria in July 1941 and
by the end of 1942 claimed to have 45 affiliated unions, of which
200 municipal workers were members. The Federation of African
Trade Unions was affiliated to the Friends of Africa, which acted
as a mouthpiece for the federation. According to Modiba, Mike
Muller approached him with the intention of uniting the two
unions, but negotiations broke up over the issue of communism to
which the Federation of African Trade Unions was vehemently
opposed.-'3 The Federation of African Trade Unions appears to have
been a marginalised grouping, and there does not appear to be any
evidence of the existence of most of its unions.
The growth of trade unions in Pretoria did not go unchallenged by
the government. When Muller first began organising, the attitude
of the Department of Labour was friendly, but "in a patronising
sort of way".=* However, as the unions became stronger, they
began to experience difficulties. There were instances where the
unions were disregarded and Muller himself was threatened with
imprisonment due to his activities as trade union organiser.
T.Lodge, "Political Organisations in Pretoria's African
Townships" in B.Bozzoli (ed), Class, Community and
Conflict, Ravan Press: Johannesburg, 1987
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Towards the end of 1942, the attitude of the Department of Labour
shifted once again as it indicated a willingness to enter into
discussion with the unions.3= This may be accounted for by the
state's concern to avoid disruption of war-time production and
the general attitude of conciliation towards African labour
during this period. As a result the Department of Labour
maintained a positive relationship with the trade unions, hoping
that their leadership would restrain workers from strike action.
Muller organised the African Municipal Workers Union in August
1942. The sources of inspiration were the urgent need for
increase in wages' for unskilled labourers made acute by the
rising cost of living due to war conditions. The municipal
compound was, according to Muller, "the stronghold of the
union."z& At the time of the riot> the union had a membership of
581 which reflected only about 277. of the total population of the
municipal compound and Tin Town. Although it is clear that the
majority of the compound dwellers were not union members, it is
reasonable to assume that a large number were aware of the
disputes regarding the wage determination and the efficacy of the
strikes in Johannesburg in December.
Union members had been informed of developments regarding wage
board determination 105 at regular meetings from September 1942
onwards. At a meeting on 16 December 1942, the union members were
Informed of the success of strike action in Johannesburg, and
Muller had called on the workers present to demand for 40/- a
week, and "to shout so loud it would be heard at the Union
Buildings."37
The Pretoria Municipality had been particularly worried about
the impact of the Johannesburg strikes. J.S.Hardy stated that
"from the time these strikes occurred in Johannesburg,
we were all expecting it to come here and there were
rumours from different sources that the municipal
natives may strike."zs
The Pretoria Municipality was extremely hostile to the Municipal
Workers' Union, viewing it as a vehicle for industrial and
communist agitation. It refused to work with the union, and, as
the possibility of a strike intensified, it stepped up the level
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December 1942> ten municipal police situated themselves at the
front of the hall. Only about 20 workers were there, and when
Muller went to the compound to investigate the lack of
attendance, he found the municipal police blocking the entrance,
on the pretext of conduction a liquor raid in the compound. The
meeting was eventually attended by over 300 workers. zs>
The Pretoria Municipality did much to emphasise the activities of
Mike Muller and the African Municipal Workers Union. Its attempts
to place the blame for the riot on the trade union and communist
agitators was probably intended to shift attention away from its
own culpability. Its refusal to upgrade the conditions and to
provide adequate wages, facilities and food in the municipal
compound contributed towards a growing sense of grievance.
What emerges from an examination of the living conditions of the
municipal workers of Pretoria is a chronicle of extreme hardship
and abysmal degradation that left in its wake a festering rage
and a growing desperation, which coupled with the possibility of
a long-awaited wage Increase being denied them, finally erupted
into violence on the night of the 28th December.
Approximately one third of Pretoria's African population lived in
compounds and hostels, with another third living in the
locations, and the final third on employers' premises as
domestic servants. The experience of urbanisation differed
substantially within each grouping.
The location dwellers lived in the areas set aside for African
residency, namely Marabastad, Bantule and Schoolplaats, and after
1940 Atteridgeville. The majority were Transvaal Sotho and
Ndebele while a substantial 'oorlams'30 population lived in
Schoolplaats and Marabastad. In 1938 the total population of the
three locations was 11 118, of whom more than 50'/. were born or
had lived a lifetime in Pretoria, and a substantial percentage
had resided there for ten years or more.31 There are no official
figures for the 1940s but it is clear that these would be
substantially higher. The development of ISCOR attracted large
numbers of workers to Pretoria, and the massive wave of
urbanisation during the Second World War would be reflected in
K 172, Vol.2: Evidence of Mike Muller
Oorlams were urban blacks who had grown up on white
farms or amongst white families in town, had acquired
skills, and closely identified with Boer culture and
society.
NTS 7682, 169/332: Report on inspection of the Pretoria
Urban Area, by C.Heald, 28 September-1 October 1942
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Pretoria as well. The African population of the locations was
relatively permanent and a strong sense of community existed
among its residents.
The nature of the compound population was substantially
different. It comprised a migrant population of single men,
totalling 10 032 men in 1942. The largest compound was at Iscor>
with a population of 3 800, where conditions and wages were
somewhat better than those off erred by the municipality.:lrz The
municipal workers formed the second largest contingent, the
majority of whom were employed as labourers, refuse removal and
sanitary, workers,' and were housed in the municipal compound and
Tin Town in Marabastad. The majority of compound dwellers were
newly urbanised migrants, and much of their urban experience was
confined to their work and the compound environment. There were
however a number of workers who had been in residence in the
compound for ten years or more.13
According to the Urban Areas Act of 1923, the Pretoria City
Council was obliged to house its employers In a suitable
compound. The Municipal compound was built in 1924 and was
situated on 55 Proes Street, Pretoria West, adjacent to
Marabastad and the Asiatic Bazaar. It had been originally
designed to accommodate 1 109 men but by August 1942, 1 329 were
crowded into the building.3*
The nature of the accommodation was hopelessly inadequate. The
litany of ills is long and indicates a complete lack of concern
for human dignity and comfort. There were 86 rooms in the
compound, each room being approximately 12 feet by 18 feet. The
bunks were made of concrete slabs in three tiers and were
designed to accommodate twelve people. However, an additional
iron bed, with no mattress or bedding, had been added, increasing
the number in each room to thirteen. The cramped quarters meant
that the amount of air space per person was below the minimum
health standards requirements. Privacy was an unheard of
commodity, and personal belongings were held with little regard.
There were no lockers provided and the continual theft of
possessions was the source of tensions and fights amongst the
3=2
 K 172, Vol 3: List of Natives in Compounds and Hostels
in Pretoria Urban Area
3 3
 K 172, Vol 2: Evidence of J.R.Brent, Manager of Native
and Asiatic Affairs, to Commission of Enquiry
3 4
 UWL, AD 1433', Cp9.2.3: Memorandum on the Municipal
Compound submitted to the Pretoria City Council by a
Deputation of Representatives of Pretoria
Organisations, 16 September 1942
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compound dwellers.3a
There was no provision for heating in the rooms. Compound
dwellers were not allowed to bring braziers into their rooms and
were forced to supply their own blankets which in themselves did
little to alleviate the cold from the concrete. There was no hot
water for washing in the compound.;<* Moreover> there were only
six or seven water taps in the area, which were adequate for
drinkingi but not for personal cleanliness.
While the conditions in the main compound were extremely bad,
they were far worse in Tin Town, another source of accommodation
for municipal workers. Tin Town had been constructed in 1938 as a
temporary measure to deal with the massive influx of people into
Pretoria. It consisted of 6? semi-circular corrugated Iron huts
on the opposite side of Proes Street. However, since its
establishment there had been no effort to relocate its
inhabitants into a more permanent structure. Each hut, intended
to house eight men, accommodated twelve, making the overall
population of Tin Town 804. The men slept foot to foot on the
ground and no water taps or heating arrangements were provided.
As the huts were unllned, they lent themselves to extremes of
heat and cold.3"'
The sanitary workers, comprising mainly Bhacca, were housed in a
separate section of the main compound.3B Their conditions of
service were exceptionally bad. They worked seven days a week, in
unpleasant conditions and there were instances where men had had
no leave for the past three years.3"*
AD 1433, Cp9.2.3: ibid; NTS 7682, 169/332: Report on
inspection of the Pretoria Urban Areas, by C.Heald, 28
September-1 October, 1942
UWL, AD 1433, Cp9.2.3: Memorandum submitted to Pretoria
City Council, 16 September 1942. An interesting
contrast to the living conditions of the municipal
workers was the compound provided for the mules and
horses belonging to the Pretoria City Council. Each
animal was provided with a scientifically constructed
stall, with a sufficient number of water taps to make
hygienic conditions possible.
ibid.
NTS 7682, 169/322: Report by C.Heald, 28 September - 1
October 1942
K 172, Vol 4: Evidence of Joseph Mgilane to the
Commission of Enquiry.
14
The majority of municipal workers were however Shangaan and
Venda. According to David Moshela, a compound worker> they
brought a distinctive quality to the compound.
"As a people, they like music. Wherever they gather you
will always see them dancing and enjoying
themselves.'"*0
As the municipality provided no recreational facilities, their
only recourse to entertainment within the compound was war
dancing. This practice, which was an Integral part of the
compound culture, went on from 8p.m. to 10p.m. nightly and on a
Sunday, began at 9a.m. Competitions were often held with teams
from Doornfontein and Braamfontein in Johannesburg and with
workers in the Kirkness compound in Pretoria,*1 and in many ways
served as a means of release of pent-up energies and tensions.
Shortly before the uprising, J.R.Brent, the Manager of Native
and Asiatic Affairs, acting on complaints made by Pretoria West
residents, had prohibited war dances in the compound. He offered
the war dancers an alternative site In Bantule or Marabastad
which they had rejected for fear of being attacked by the
Amalaita in these areas.•= The loss of their only source of
recreation in the compound, particularly over the festive season,
narrowly circumscribed the workers' cultural world. They "felt
very sore about it",*3 and it clearly contributed to a growing
sense of frustration and grievance.
The poor quality and inadequate food supply was central to the
workers' discontent and their physical attack on the kitchen
buildings during the demonstration became a symbolic unleashing
of their anger. There was no dining hall, and men had to wait In
a queue to be served. Often by the time they had returned to
their rooms to eat, the food was cold. But the workers' anger was
largely focused on their meagre rations. African witnesses at the
Commission of Enquiry repeatedly voiced complaints about the
quality of food. George Maori Insisted that the "food at home is
K 172, Vol 4: Evidence of David Moshela to the
Commission of Enquiry
K 172, Vol 4: Evidence of Mack Mabaso to the Commission
of Enquiry
The majority of Amalaita in Pretoria were drawn from
domestic servants though approximately 10% of the gang
membership was made up of young, compounded Africans.
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better than what I get here""*"1 while compound rations were
invariably supplemented by the workers' own food. Jackson Maboko,
a compound dweller, spent as much as 6d. daily on extra meat
which was only issued twice a week."*3 According to David
Moshela, "this little kitchen is the one that is starving us."**
The men received weekly rations of two pounds of meat, half a
pound of offal, one pound of dry beans and two and a quarter
vegetables, which were usually not fresh and in certain cases not
fit for human consumption, and daily rations of two pounds of
mealie meal and one pint of coffee.*' The paltry portions and the
insipid nature of the diet clearly irked the workers, but the
major complaint was the quality of the mealie meal, which was
yellow instead of white, and was virtually unpalatable.3' Had the
compound manager explained to the workers that yellow meal was
all that was available as a result of the shortages of food
during the Second World War, the workers might not have voiced
such vociferous complaints.
The Native and Asiatic Committee of the Pretoria City Council
recognised that immediate improvements needed to be implemented
In the municipal compound and it had intended to provide some
cosmetic changes. The City Council voted £7,200 to provide
dlnlng-recreation rooms where the existing sleeping
accommodation was and to build dormitories above the dining hall.
However the scheme had not been introduced, largely as a result
of the protests of the Pretoria West Ratepayers Association. They
objected to the presence of Marabastad and the municipal compound
in their midst and were concerned to have the principle of
segregation applied in Pretoria West. They therefore blocked any
attempts at improvements which might then make the structures
K 172, Vol 4: Evidence of George Maori, Commission of
Enquiry
K 172 Vol 2: Evidence of Jackson Maboko, Commission of
Enquiry
K 172, Voi 4: Evidence of David Moshela to the
Commission of Enquiry
K 172 Vol 3: Rationing of the Pretoria Compounded
Bantu", K 172 Vol 5: Memorandum of evidence by the
Members of the Native Representative Council and
Spokesmen for the African Municipal Workers
K 172, Vol 2:: Evidence of Jackson Maboko to the
Commission of Enquiry
16
more permanent.33 As a result the compound dwellers continued to
suffer the indignities of their circumstances without redress of
grievances until their desperation erupted into militant action.
The severity of the events of the 28th December, the loss of life
and random violence, prompted the government to appoint a
Commission of Enquiry to investigate the circumstances of the
riot In the municipal compound. The Commission sat from 4 January
to 22 February 1943. Much of the cross-examination of trade
unionists by members of the Commission was highly antagonistic
and it appeared that the Commission1 s hidden agenda was to place
responsibility for the riot on communist agitators and the trade
unions. Yet despite this disposition, the Commission vindicated
the Communist Party and unionists. And in the final analysis the
Commission found the Minister of Labour to have acted Illegally)
and disclosed definite shortcomings in the Council's treatment of
its workers with regard to housing, food and recreational
facilities. 2"» Clearly the conditions in the compound were so
devastating that the Commission could not help but highlight
their negative effects on the municipal workers.
The municipal workers' deep-rooted anger at their intolerable
conditions was undoubtedly compounded by the rising cost of
living and food shortages heralded by the Second World War. But
the findings of the Commission need to be contextualised within
the framework of local state policy. The cornerstone of the
Council's African housing policy was the removal of its inner-
city locations. The Council's belief that Pretoria occupied a
special place as the administrative capital of the Union led
them to view total segregation as the only solution to presence
of Africans in town.-*0 A stronger motivating force for the
removal of Marabastad and its environs was the continuous
pressure exerted on the Council by the white ratepayers of
Pretoria West. Historically, this group had raised the strongest
objections to the presence of Marabastad and the municipal
compound which bordered on the white suburb.31 The Council's
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willingness to acquiesce to the demands of the white ratepayers
of Pretoria West meant that the harsh conditions confronting the
inhabitants of the muncipal compound and Tin Town were not
alleviated in any way. Removal also became a catchphrase for
justifying the Council's inaction as to the ameriolatlon of
conditions. According to the Council, the expenditure was not
warranted as the locations and compound were to be removed
eventually.
While the Commission's vindication of the trade unions was hailed
as a triumph for the trade unions, it was in a sense a pyrrhic
victory for it highlighted their ineffective organisation of
workers in the compound. The African Muncipal Workers Union had
succeeded in gaining a membership of only 27% of the compound
dwellers. While it is difficult to determine the effectiveness of
the AMWU on the ground, the union was responsible for increasing
the awareness of the municipal workers of the labour legislation-
that affected them, and of industrial unrest in Johannesburg.
Thus the role of the union appeared to be more that of a source
of information than a strong mobilising force. The riot provided
short term gains for the trade unions, but these were not
sustained. Immediately after the riot, membership of the African
Municipal Workers Union increased from 581 to 872.3= Workers must
have attributed the success of the wage board determination in
part to the work of the union. The Pretoria City Council also
decided to recognise informally the union. However strikes and
lockouts were still considered illegal.31 Union membership soon
began to fall off and after the war, African labour organisation
in Pretoria went into decline.3'1
The weaknesses of trade union organisation in Pretoria, and this
is a question that the Commission failed to investigate, must be
attributed to the CPSA's policy with regard to extending
unionism on a regional level. The low priority given to Pretoria
was reflected in the appointment of a young, inexperienced
activist to head the Pretoria branch of CNETU. The difficulty of
organising a compounded work force, which worked in different
places and on different shifts, also proved a stumbling block to
effective union organisation.
The reluctance of the Pretoria Municipality to recognise African
trade unions and to work with them contributed to the outbreak of
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violence on the night of the 28th December. The attempts Of the
Pretoria City council to evade wage board determination 105 and
the complicity of the Minister of Labour in this regard served to
fuel the discontent that the municipal workers were already
feeling. Within this context, the possibility of not receiving
the increase that was due to them, led to a spontaneous uprising
on the premises of the main muncipal compund.
